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Abstract 
A key challenge for macroeconomic policy in open economies is how to simultaneously 
manage exchange rates, interest rates and capital account openness—the trilemma. This 
paper calculates a trilemma index for India and investigates its evolution over time. We 
find that financial integration has increased markedly after the mid-2000s, with 
corresponding limitations on monetary independence and exchange rate stability. This 
tradeoff has been mitigated, however, with the rise of international reserves as a partially 
independent instrument of macroeconomic policy. In addition, we confirm that the 
weighted sum of the three indexes adds up to a constant, validating the notion that a rise 
in one trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of the weighted sum of the 
other two. Finally, we consider the implications of changes in the trilemma index for 
macroeconomic outcomes. We find some evidence that greater financial integration and 
corresponding loss of monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability has influenced 
inflation and inflation volatility, though not in a consistent manner.  
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1. Introduction 
A key challenge for macroeconomic policy in open economies is how to 
simultaneously manage exchange rates, interest rates and capital account openness—the 
open economy trilemma. The basic premise of the international policy trilemma principle 
is that a tradeoff exists between interest rate policy (monetary policy) independence, 
exchange rate stability, and financial integration and that changing one component is 
necessarily associated with a corresponding change in a combination of the other two 
components.  
The trilemma principle has come into greater focus in recent decades as emerging 
markets aim at exchange rate and macroeconomic stability while becoming increasingly 
integrated into world financial markets.1 The trend towards greater financial globalization 
in most emerging markets around the world is well documented and has imposed a new 
set of challenges for policymakers (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti; 2003, 2007). Today most 
emerging markets operate in the range of partial financial integration with regulations 
restricting the flow of funds and ‘managed’ floating regimes with central banks actively 
intervening in foreign currency markets (Aizenman, 2010).2  
India also fits this general pattern, following a nuanced path of gradual capital 
account liberalization. Since the early 1990s, the macro-economic environment in India 
has changed substantially from being tightly controlled and regulated to one experiencing 
gradual deregulation and liberalization (Shah, 2008; Mohan and Kapur, 2009). These 
developments and structural changes have impacted the financial environment and 
external constraints facing Indian policymakers, and may have influenced operating 
procedures and effective policy tradeoffs between the trilemma choices. In particular, the 
trilemma principle predicts that India’s experience with increasing financial integration 
would likely have been accompanied, ceteris paribus, by a loss of monetary 
                                                        
1 Aizenman (2010) provides a detailed description of the trade-offs faced by countries in making policy 
choices in context of the trilemma. Aizenman, Chinn, Ito (2008, 2010) have investigated the trilemma 
empirically in a cross-section of a large number of countries. 
2 A few countries, notably China, have resisted this trend. China maintains strict controls on international 
capital flows which, together with a massive buildup in international reserves, allow maintenance of a rigid 
exchange rate and a large degree of monetary independence (Glick and Hutchison, 2009).  
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independence and/or loss of exchange rate stability. Evidence of increasing financial 
integration, for example, is closer linkage of short-term interest rates in India with those 
abroad (Hutchison, Kendall, Pasricha and Singh, 2010; Hutchison, Pasricha and Singh, 
2010).  
To what extent has financial integration imposed greater constraints on exchange 
rate and interest rates policies in India? What has been the cost of international financial 
liberalization in terms of macroeconomic policy? This paper addresses these questions by 
measuring the tradeoff between financial integration, exchange rate stability and 
monetary independence in India. We calculate a trilemma index for India and investigate 
its evolution over time using a methodology developed and employed for a cross-section 
of countries by Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008, 2009 and 2010).  A novel aspect of their 
work is measuring the trilemma over a large cross section of countries while 
simultaneously taking into account the role of international reserves in macroeconomic 
management. We focus on India in our work, detail the evolution of the trilemma over 
time, associate changes in the macroeconomic policy tradeoff with financial liberalization 
and measure the extent to which international reserve management has played a role.  
Previewing the results, our empirical measures confirm earlier research findings 
that financial integration has increased markedly after the mid-2000s. The rise in 
financial integration, in turn, has come with corresponding limitations on monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability. However, we also find that this tradeoff or 
constraint on policy has been mitigated with the rise of international reserves as a 
partially independent and actively employed instrument of macroeconomic policy. India 
has actively managed its exchange rate, building up a high level of international reserves 
by intervening heavily in the foreign exchange market, and has successfully limited 
exchange rate volatility (by international comparison) and maintained some control over 
monetary policy. Active intervention in foreign exchange markets and maintaining a 
degree of control over international capital flows has proved a potent combination of 
policy instruments in India.  
Section 2 provides a narrative account of the process of financial integration in 
India, and describes how it was led both by explicit policy decisions and private market 
forces in India and abroad as part of a broader trend of financial globalization. Measuring 
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the evolution of the trilemma index in India is the subject of section 3. The extent to 
which financial integration has impacted the trilemma facing India monetary authorities 
is evaluated empirically in section 4. Section 5 discusses how changes in the external 
constraints, as represented by shifts in the trilemma indices, have influenced inflation and 
inflation volatility outcomes in India. The analysis also explores the role played by 
international reserves and changes in the level of reserves. Section 6 concludes the paper 
with a summary and discussion of future research directions.  
 
2. The Trilemma, financial liberalization and international reserves in 
India 
The Indian economy witnessed several structural changes during the past two 
decades. Following a balance of payments crisis in 1991, a deeper and more 
comprehensive series of liberalization and deregulation measures were implemented with 
regard to the banking sector and financial markets. Between 1992 and 1997, lending rates 
of commercial banks were deregulated, and the issue of ad hoc treasury bills was phased 
out (thereby eliminating automatic monetization of the budget deficit). In 1994, India 
switched over to a mainly market-determined exchange rate system and instituted current 
account convertibility. Over the 1990s, the exchange rate depreciated substantially 
against the US dollar, continuing a process that had begun in the 1980s.  
Starting in 1998, the RBI undertook strong monetary policy measures (increasing 
interest rates and withdrawing liquidity) to deal with concerns about excessive liquidity 
and speculation in the foreign exchange market. The foreign exchange market was 
characterized by a high degree of volatility following the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis towards the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998. These emergency measures were 
gradually reversed once the threat had abated of the crisis spilling over to India.  
During the subsequent period, through the mid-2000s, the RBI continued to refine 
its approach to macroeconomic management. With global and domestic inflation 
relatively low, the RBI set a band for target inflation of 4-5%, which was low by 
historical standards. Moreover while domestic fixed income markets continued to be thin 
(as opposed to vibrant stock exchanges), especially for corporate bonds, a market for 
government securities began developing in this period. Against this background, in the 
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next couple of subsections we analyze the role played by capital account liberalization 
and reserves management in altering the trilemma trade-offs faced by Indian policy-
makers.  
 
2.1 Financial integration and policy trade offs 
Over the past 15 years or so the RBI continued to gradually ease capital controls, 
with implications for the functioning of domestic financial markets. Relaxations of 
capital controls included easing of requirements for and caps on foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs), streamlining of approval processes, and allowing FIIs to hedge exchange 
rate risk in currency forward markets. However, with regard to capital account 
liberalization, Indian policy-makers adopted a cautious stance from the very start 
(Hutchison, Kendall, Pasricha and Singh, 2010) as a result of which the process has been 
a continuous albeit a slow and gradual one. This perhaps was partly due to possible 
linkages between capital account and current account transactions such as capital 
outflows and trade mis-invoicing and partly owing to external events such as the Asian 
financial crisis, which reignited the debate on capital account openness for emerging 
markets.  
Hence though the Indian economy has witnessed gradual financial liberalization 
over the past couple of decades but substantial controls on capital inflows continue to 
exist, as documented in Box 1. These restrictions can be best described as “complex, 
discretionary and fragmented” as in Hutchison, Pasricha and Singh (2010).  Moreover, 
compared to other emerging market economies, India still has a relatively low degree of 
financial integration when measured as total external assets and liabilities as a percent of 
GDP (Figure 1). (The figure also shows that India has relatively low degree of exchange 
rate volatility).    
The economy also started witnessing sharp increases in capital inflows over the 
last decade, especially in the years prior to the recent global financial crisis that started in 
2007. Unlike the fast-growing East Asian economies, India has mostly run current 
account deficits, albeit modest, so there have been net capital inflows over most of its 
history. Earlier aid flows, however, have been displaced by private direct and portfolio 
investment from abroad (Hutchison, Pasricha, Singh, 2010). Large capital inflows in 
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some circumstances may increase the domestic money supply and put pressure on the 
exchange rate to appreciate. Moreover, given the relatively low exchange rate flexibility, 
the gradual process of capital account liberalization has the potential to cause distortions 
in the monetary policy. Thus, during this period, the RBI faced the traditional trilemma 
problem of maintaining an independent monetary policy in the face of international 
capital inflows and a desire to stabilize the exchange rate. The RBI also actively engaged 
in sterilization of inflows and began to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, detailed 
further in subsection 2.2.  
Like most emerging market economies, India suffered from the spillover effects 
of the current global financial crisis. This recent episode again reflects the trilemma at 
work in Indian monetary policy making, in this instance where capital outflows and 
reserve losses (to limit exchange rate depreciation) presents a contractionary influence on 
domestic monetary policy. In particular, one of the main effects of the global financial 
crisis on the Indian financial markets, particularly following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, was in the form of reduction in net capital inflows. The 
withdrawal of funds from the Indian equity markets, along with reduced access of Indian 
entities to funds from international markets put significant pressure on dollar liquidity in 
the domestic foreign exchange market. As described in the IMF country report for June 
2009, while foreign direct investment (FDI) continued to remain strong, external 
commercial borrowings were less than half of their 2007-08 levels. Portfolio outflows 
amounted to US$9 billion in 2008Q2-Q4. This led to depreciation pressures and higher 
volatility in the foreign exchange market. In the event of such large capital outflows, the 
RBI undertook foreign exchange intervention measures to limit pressures on domestic 
liquidity, which in turn resulted in large losses in foreign exchange reserves.3 Reserves 
fell by US$2.8 billion to US$248 billion by 2009Q1.  
The picture however has changed dramatically over the last year as the global 
economy has begun to climb upwards from the trough of the recession, again switching 
the particular constraints associated with the trilemma.  The Indian economy has been 
among the first to recover from the crisis. Improved growth prospects have been 
                                                        
3 For more detail, see IMF (2009) and RBI(2009) 
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accompanied by large capital inflows. Investments of Foreign Institutional Investors 
(FIIs) have gone up by US $22.8 billion during 2009Q2-2009Q4, as against a net 
withdrawal of US $11.9 billion during the corresponding period of the previous financial 
year. Consequently, the Indian rupee appreciated by 11.24 percent against the US dollar 
as on January, 2010 compared to March, 2009. Inflation pressures have also been 
intensifying even as financial markets seem to have regained lost ground and growth 
seems to be approaching pre-crisis levels. Headline (WPI) inflation averaging at 10% or 
more, has fuelled debate as to whether the RBI should be tightening its monetary policy 
stance. In context of these international and domestic macro developments, the question 
of where India stands today with respect to the financial trilemma becomes even more 
significant and pertinent. 
 
2.2 Foreign exchange reserve management and intervention  
India has had an active foreign exchange management policy, with effective 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and very large growth in foreign exchange 
reserves. Foreign exchange reserves climbed from around USD $150 billion in mid-2005 
to over USD $300 billion in mid-2010, a doubling in just five years and making India one 
of the largest reserve-holding countries in the world. The dramatic rise in reserves during 
this period indicates substantial and sustained USD purchases, and sales of the Indian 
currency, in the foreign exchange market by the authorities in order to limit rupee 
appreciation. This is shown in Figure 2. Since India had a current account deficit in the 
balance of payments during this period, so official purchases of foreign exchange were 
off-setting the substantial private capital inflows into India. These capital inflows are 
related in turn to partial relaxation of capital account restrictions, one part of the 
trilemma.  
Another element of the trilemma tradeoff is the extent to which the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves has had a substantial impact on monetary policy. Figure 3, 
showing the rise of the monetary base and its two main components (net domestic credit 
and international reserves), suggests that it has had a substantial impact. The major asset 
of the Reserve Bank of India supporting the growth of central bank money (reserve 
money) is international reserve assets. These have accumulated so rapidly in recent years 
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that the central bank has been forced to sell off government securities (decline in net 
domestic assets) in order to maintain monetary control (IMF Country Report 10/73, Table 
4; March 2010). The RBI is attempting to limit the impact of international reserves on the 
money supply, but to what extent has it been able to maintain monetary control in light of 
financial liberalization and large inflows of capital into India? 
To shed some light on this issue we estimate a very simple sterilization equation 
whereby (the change in) net domestic assets series is regressed on (the change in) net 
foreign assets (NFA). We use data on net domestic assets and net foreign assets, both 
from the RBI database, available directly as quarterly series. 
Results are shown in Table 1. A coefficient of minus one indicates that the RBI 
has been completely successful in insulating base money (RBI reserve money) from the 
accumulation of international reserves, i.e. a one rupee rise in international reserves is 
associated with a one rupee decline in net domestic assets. We also include a lagged 
dependent variable and lagged (four-quarter lag) industrial production (IP) to control for 
other factors influencing the growth of base money.  
We split the (quarterly) sample into three equal parts (1996q2-2000q3, 2000q4-
2005q1, and 2005q2-2009q3) to evaluate how sterilization and monetary control has 
changed over time in response to external financial liberalization, with the most recent 
period representing the period with the most open capital account. The sterilization 
coefficient equals -0.77, -0.87 and -0.44, respectively, for the three periods. This suggests 
that most of the rise in international reserves was offset by corresponding declines in the 
net domestic assets (up to 87%) from 1996-2004, but the control of money was 
comprised in the latter part of the decade as the RBI offset less than half (0.44). This 
suggests that monetary independence was partially lost in response to the relaxation of 
capital controls. We explore this issue more formally in the next two sections. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Our approach to analyzing India’s response to the trilemma follows Aizenman, 
Chinn and Ito (2008, 2010). We first construct indices for each of the three policy 
objectives of the trilemma: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital 
account openness (or financial integration). We then estimate a linear model for the 
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trilemma configuration that is revealed by the data, by regressing a constant on the three 
indices. Next, we examine the role of international reserve accumulation in affecting 
policy outcomes, through the interaction of reserves with the trilemma configuration. 
Finally, we examine the impacts of reserve changes and sterilization efforts on the 
conduct and outcomes of India’s monetary policy in the context of the trilemma. 
We depart from Aizenman, Chinn and Ito in several respects. While they use 
cross-country data and time-averages of annual data, so that their major source of 
variation is across countries, we use data for a single country. Furthermore, the data is 
higher frequency, being quarterly, and subject therefore to substantial time variation. 
Indeed, we find that there is variation in the results across three equal sub-periods into 
which we divide our sample.  We also use a different measure of capital account 
openness than the preceding authors. Finally, our exploration of the impacts of reserve 
changes and sterilization efforts also marks a departure from Aizenman, Chinn and Ito. 
 
3.1 Data 
The data extends from 1996Q2 to 2009Q3, covering 54 quarters.4 For the 
trilemma indices, we have quarterly data on GDP, foreign investment inflows and foreign 
investment outflows, all from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) website (Database on the 
Indian Economy). The exchange rate is a weekly series obtained from the Global 
Financial Database (www.globalfinancial data.com). We use the nominal Rupee-to-US 
dollar exchange rate. We use the weekly series to construct a quarterly index of exchange 
rate stability, as described in the next subsection. From the same source, we use weekly 
90-day rates on government securities for the US and India. The correlations between 
these are used to create a quarterly index of monetary independence, again as described 
in the next subsection. 
To examine the impact of international reserves, we again use data from the RBI. 
For most of the period, the data is weekly, while for some of the early part of the period, 
it is less frequent. We average reserves figures for each quarter to construct a quarterly 
                                                        
4 These periods correspond to 1996-97: Q1 to 2009-10: Q2 according to the Indian fiscal year accounting. 
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series for international reserves.  Since reserves are a stock, and GDP is a flow, when we 
calculate the reserves-to-GDP ratio using quarterly data, we annualize the GDP figure by 
multiplying it by four.  We also use changes in reserves: these are taken directly from a 
quarterly series in the RBI database. 
The policy outcomes we examine are inflation and inflation volatility. For both 
measures, we begin with the weekly Wholesale Price Index (WPI), from the RBI 
database. We then calculate weekly annual inflation figures. Averaging these for each 
quarter produces a quarterly inflation series. The standard deviation for each quarter 
yields our inflation volatility series. 
 
3.2 Methodology and Estimation 
The key constructs for examining the policy configuration with respect to the 
trilemma are indices of monetary independence (MI), exchange rate stability (ES) and 
capital account openness (KO). These indices are constructed as follows. 
MI Index 
We follow Aizenman, Chinn and Ito in measuring MI as the reciprocal of the 
correlation of interest rates in the home country (here India) and the base country (here 
the United States). Quarterly correlations are calculated using weekly interest rate data. 
The interest rates are on 90-day government securities. The precise formula is: 
 
The scaling ensures that the index lies between 0 and 1, with the highest value 
indicating the greatest degree of monetary independence. The plot of the MI index is 
shown in Figure 4. 
ES Index 
Again we follow Aizenman, Chinn and Ito in constructing this index, adjusting for 
the differences in periodicity of the data. We calculate the quarterly standard deviations 
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of the change in the log of the Rupee-US dollar exchange rate, and the index is then 
constructed according to the formula: 
 
Again, the scaling ensures that the index lies between 0 and 1, with the highest value 
indicating the greatest degree of exchange rate stability. The evolution of this index for 
the sample period is shown in Figure 5. 
KO Index 
For construction of the KO index, we depart from Aizenman, Chinn and Ito, who use 
the Chinn-Ito index. For India, this index is essentially constant over the entire period, 
and may not capture well the changes that have been occurring in India’s management of 
the capital account. Even other de jure measures such as that of Nayyar (2006) are not 
suitable, since they are only annual, and are not available for the latest part of our sample 
period. Therefore, we chose to go with a simple de facto measure of capital account 
openness, using the ratio of the sum of inward and outward foreign investment flows to 
GDP.  
This measure also has drawbacks, since it is a function not only of the policy stance, 
but also of market sentiment. However, we believe it is a reasonable way of capturing 
changes in India’s effective openness to international capital flows, and how those have 
changed over time. This index is easy to construct as a quarterly series. One other point 
should be noted: the KO index is not theoretically constrained to lie between 0 and 1 – 
the upper bound cannot be imposed. However, for the sample period, it is easily met. As 
we shall see in the next section, scaling issues are partly dealt with in the regression 
analysis for the trilemma policy configuration. The KO index for the sample period is 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
   11 
4. Empirical Results: Policy Stance 
In this section, we first examine the policy stance with respect to the trilemma, 
using the indices constructed in the previous section, and then relate the trilemma stance 
to the accumulation of foreign reserves, using the techniques introduced by Aizenman, 
Chinn and Ito. 
 
4.1 Measuring the trilemma policy configuration  
The central idea for measuring the trilemma policy configuration is that an 
increase in one of the indices must be balanced by a decrease in another, since there is an 
overall constraint on the three indices – all three cannot reach there maximum values 
simultaneously. At the same time, there is no reason for policymakers to not try for a 
combination of the three indices that is as high as possible, if all three objectives of 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital openness (or financial 
integration) are desirable for some reason. However, the latter is an empirical question, 
and can be examined using the method of Aizenman, Chinn and Ito. 
The approach used is to regress a constant (we use the value 2) on the three 
indices. Of course, the constant term is omitted on the right hand side of the estimation 
equation. Since, unlike ACI, we are using a time series for a single country to estimate 
the trilemma configuration, and the period under consideration was one of dramatic 
changes in external conditions as well as shifts in policy stances, we divide the entire 
sample period into three equal sub-periods of 18 quarters each. This allows one to see 
how differences in policy across different segments of this 13.5 year span have played 
out. The results are reported in Table 2A.  The coefficients are not always estimated with 
great precision (particularly those for monetary independence), but the overall fit is 
extremely good, reflected in the very high R-squared numbers. This is consistent with the 
kind of results obtained by ACI, but it should be noted again that these results are 
obtained for a single country and a sample that incorporates short-run variability 
associated with quarterly data. 
Table 2A also reports the means of the three indices for each of the three sub-
periods.  According to these measures, monetary independence is in an intermediate 
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range in all three sub-periods. It falls in the second period, then partially recovers. 
Exchange rate stability is quite high in the first two periods, then falls somewhat. Capital 
account openness increases a little from the first to the second period, then dramatically 
in the third period. 
Following ACI, the key measure of the trilemma policy configuration is obtained 
by examining the contribution of each policy dimension to the total – here set to be 2. 
This can be calculated quarter-by-quarter, but we calculate and report the average 
contributions, by multiplying the coefficients by the means for each sub-period. The 
results are quite striking. Given the high goodness of fit, it is unsurprising that the 
contributions sum up to close to 2 in each sub-period. The contributions themselves are 
of great interest in terms of the trilemma policy configuration and how it changes over 
time.5 The story they tell is as follows: 
• Exchange rate stability receives high policy weight throughout the entire 13.5 year 
period.  
• In the second sub-period, as capital openness or financial integration increases, 
monetary independence is completely lost, whereas there is an attempt to retain, or 
even strengthen, exchange rate stability.  
• In the third sub-period, as capital openness continues to increase, some exchange rate 
stability is sacrificed to recover some monetary independence, though the final 
configuration involves less monetary independence and greater financial integration, 
as compared to the first sub-period. 
The story that emerges from Table 2 is consistent with the broad outlines of what 
happened in India over this period. It is true that the variation in policy stances with 
respect to the trilemma may have not corresponded exactly to the three sub-periods we 
have chosen. However, that makes the results even more striking, in our view. Our results 
suggest that the ACI approach can be used effectively for single country time series, and 
not just for panels or cross-sections with time variation smoothed out. 
                                                        
5 Here we can explain why there is some freedom from scaling issues with respect to the capital 
openness index not being constrained to a maximum of one, in the final analysis. Suppose that, for 
example, the KO index were multiplied by 2, so that average capital openness was doubled in the new 
measure. First, relative values over time would still have the same proportions. Second, the 
regression coefficient would be halved, so that the contribution would be unaffected by the rescaling. 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4.2 Trilemma policy stance and reserve accumulation 
An important part of the ACI analysis is their connection of reserve accumulation 
to the trilemma policy configuration. The broad idea is that reserve accumulation gives 
policymakers more flexibility in dealing with the short-run tradeoffs between monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability, where financial integration is a given.  This is 
examined in the context of regressions that examine the role of reserves in achieving 
certain policy goals, and we present such results shortly. However, we first illustrate this 
fourth policy dimension with the diamond graph developed by ACI. Again, the difference 
here is that the graph represents a single country’s experience, rather than any kind of 
average over a group of countries. The diamond graph, Figure 7, shows that India has 
increased its ratio of reserves to GDP along with its increase financial integration, as it 
has tried to balance monetary independence and exchange rate stability. The story in 
Figure 7 is that of Table 2, with the addition of the changing role of foreign reserves. 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the increase in international reserves over the time period under 
consideration. 
 
5. Trilemma and Inflation: Impacts on macroeconomic outcomes 
ACI examine the impact of the trilemma policy configuration and its interaction 
with the level of reserves on three policy outcomes: output volatility, inflation volatility 
and the level of inflation. Since output data is not available for sufficiently high 
frequencies to allow construction of a quarterly output volatility series, we focus on the 
latter two outcomes. Also, given the limited degrees of freedom in the subsamples, we do 
not include any other controls – in any case, most of the control variables used by ACI 
are relevant for cross-country estimations.  
We first present results for the level of reserves, in section 5.1. Then, in section 
5.2, we examine an alternative specification, with the reserves level replaced by the 
change in reserves. The latter specification allows us to compare two different ways of 
thinking about the impact of reserves and their interaction with the trilemma policy 
configuration, in affecting macroeconomic outcomes. Reserves level changes can 
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potentially tell us something about how reserves are being used in practice to soften the 
trilemma trade-off, particularly between exchange rate stability and monetary policy 
independence. 
 
5.1 Trilemma indices and level of reserves 
Results for inflation volatility and inflation are presented in Tables 3 and 4 
respectively. Since the three trilemma indices are collinear, we estimate regressions using 
two indices at a time,6 as in ACI. The R-squared for the regressions in Table 3 are in the 
range of about 0.16 to 0.46. Few of the coefficients are statistically significant in the 
various regressions. However, several patterns are discernible in the results in Table 3. 
First, exchange rate stability appears to dampen inflation volatility: the coefficient is 
always negative. Second, increased capital account openness seems to be weakly 
associated with higher inflation volatility. In both cases, the interaction terms of the 
trilemma indices with the reserves-GDP ratio are of the opposite signs, suggesting that 
the accumulation of reserves softens the impact of the trilemma policy stance. This is 
roughly consistent with the hypothesis of the work of ACI and other work by Aizenman 
(2010). The patterns with respect to monetary independence are less clear-cut, and the 
direct impact of reserve accumulation on inflation volatility is also somewhat mixed 
across the specifications and different sub-periods. Finally, it should be emphasized that 
the coefficients are not typically statistically significant, so the patterns should be taken 
as suggestive and requiring further investigation. 
With respect to the level of inflation, the results are presented in Table 4. The 
patterns in these results display some striking differences from those for inflation 
volatility. Increased financial integration does not appear to increase the level of inflation 
– in fact, the coefficients are mostly negative. On the other hand, monetary independence 
does not seem to matter for the level of inflation.  
The most interesting feature of the results in Table 4 involves exchange rate 
stability, the level of reserves, and their interaction. In the first sub-period, both these 
factors seem to increase the level of inflation, though these positive effects are muted by 
                                                        
6 ACI also construct principal components of the trilemma indices and use those in the regressions. 
That possibility remains to be explored in this data set. 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the interaction of the two variables. However, in the second sub-period, these impacts are 
exactly reversed. The first sub-period is the one that is inconsistent with the typical 
findings for different cross-country regressions in ACI. This sub-period is also the one in 
which exchange rate stability and reserves have the strongest negative impacts on 
inflation volatility (Table 3), suggesting a trade-off between the two objectives in this 
time frame. It is possible that the result is also related to the transition in the conduct of 
monetary policy that took place during this period of the late 1990s.  
 
5.2 Trilemma indices and changes in reserves 
In Tables 5 and 6 we present parallel results to those in Tables 3 and 4, but with 
the level of reserves replaced by the change in the level for that period. While the level of 
reserves provides information about the room for maneuver with respect to the trilemma 
policy configuration, changes in the level give an indication of how policy action is being 
taken. The goodness of fit of the regressions is again variable, but roughly in line with 
those for the regressions with the level of reserves. 
In the case of inflation volatility (Table 5), none of the trilemma indices have 
statistically significant coefficients in any of the three sub-periods. The signs for the 
capital openness index are predominantly negative, which would imply that capital 
openness is associated with lower inflation volatility, though the relationship is not one 
can assert with confidence. Increases in reserves, on the other hand are mostly associated 
with increases in inflation volatility, though again the relationships are not statistically 
significant. However, the interaction of increased capital openness and reserve 
accumulation (positive changes in the level of reserves) is associated with reductions in 
inflation volatility, and this relationship is statistically significant in the first sub-period. 
Turning to the level of inflation (Table 6), there is a strong negative relationship 
between monetary independence and the level of inflation in the first two sub-periods, 
though not in the third sub-period, which saw both the culmination of a boom and the 
bust that followed it. This is what might be termed an expected result, though it does not 
always obtain in the ACI cross-country estimations. 
Increases in the level of reserves mostly have positive effects on the level of 
inflation, which would also be consistent with an increase in the monetary base. In a 
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couple of cases, the impact is statistically significant.  However, in the first two sub-
periods, the interaction term of the monetary independence index and changes in the level 
of reserves is negative (and significant in one case), suggesting that increases in reserves 
when combined with increased monetary autonomy tend to dampen inflation, amplifying 
the effect of monetary independence alone.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The “impossible trinity” or trilemma refers to the argument that an open economy 
cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, an independent monetary policy 
and an open capital account. It may choose any of these three policy goals at any given 
time, but not all of them together. This constitutes a primary challenge faced by most 
emerging market economies that have embraced capital account liberalization. India-one 
of the fastest growing small open economies in today’s world is no exception, especially 
since the Indian economy has only a partially open capital account and a ‘managed’ 
floating exchange rate regime. In the context of the current global financial crisis of 
2008-09 emerging market economies including India, have been experiencing capital 
inflow surges and face the dual policy challenge of maintaining a stable exchange rate 
and retaining monetary policy autonomy. Against such a background, the question as to 
where India stands today with respect to the financial trilemma, is a highly significant 
and pertinent one. In this paper we empirically explore this question and associated 
issues, such as accumulation of international reserves and sterilization by the RBI.  
Using quarterly data from 1996 to 2009, we construct trilemma indices for each of 
the three policy objectives: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital 
account openness, for India following the methodology developed for a cross-section of 
economies by Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008). The results of our empirical analysis 
confirm earlier research findings that an increase in financial integration, especially after 
the mid 2000s, has changed the policy trade offs facing emerging market economies like 
India. The increase in capital account openness has come at the cost of reduction in 
monetary policy independence or of limitations on exchange rate stability. We also find 
that in some cases, greater financial integration and the corresponding loss of monetary 
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autonomy and exchange rate stability has influenced inflation and inflation volatility 
outcomes.       
We also investigate the role played by international reserves in mitigating the 
severity of the trilemma faced by India, given that India is now one of the biggest 
hoarders of foreign exchange reserves. We find that indeed India has been able to 
actively manage the exchange rate and limit exchange rate volatility relative to other 
emerging market economies, by building up international reserves and intervening 
actively in the foreign exchange market. Such reserve management has also helped to 
some extent in regaining control over monetary policy even in the face of capital inflows.  
Finally, we examine the impact of changes in reserve stock and sterilization 
efforts by the RBI, on the conduct of Indian monetary policy in context of the trilemma. 
We find that most of the increase in reserves during our sample period was offset by 
concomitant declines in net domestic assets, thereby suggesting that as a consequence of 
relaxation of capital controls, the Indian economy did partially lose monetary policy 
independence. However this issue warrants more detailed empirical investigation and is 
left as a future extension of this research.  
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Box I: A Few Major Capital Account Restrictions in India 
 Portfolio Investment: 
By the Foreign Exchange Management Act, FIIs, Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), and 
Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) are allowed to invest in primary and secondary capital 
markets in India through the portfolio investment scheme (PIS). Under this scheme, 
FIIs and NRIs are permitted to acquire shares or debentures of Indian companies 
through Indian stock exchanges. The ceiling for overall investment for FIIs is 24% of 
the paid up capital of the Indian company and 10% for NRIs and PIOs. FII inflows 
into Indian equities have gone up steadily ever since the markets were opened in 1993. 
With the exception of 1999 and 2009, net flows have been positive. FIIs own 16% of 
equities (worth US$147bn) of India's biggest 500 companies and account for 10-15% 
of equity volumes.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-09 and heightened capital outflows, 
curbs on foreign issuance of equity derivatives (P-notes) imposed in October 2007 
have been removed. Annual limits on FII holdings of corporate bonds and government 
bonds have also been raised from US$3 billion to US$15 billion and from US$3 
billion to US$5 billion, respectively. Restrictions on FII allocations across equity and 
debt instruments have also been removed.  
Foreign Direct Investment: 
FDI in India is limited at 74% in private banks and telecoms, 51% in single-brand 
retailing, 26% in insurance, defense and oil refining and 20% in radio and it is 
prohibited in retail trading, atomic energy, real estate and agricultural businesses.  
External Commercial Borrowing (ECB): 
ECBs are being permitted by the Government of India for providing an additional 
source of funds to Indian corporates and public sector units. ECBs face a minimum 
average maturity of 3 years(up to US$20 million) and 5 years(US$ 20-500 million). 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has eased the norms for raising funds through ECBs. 
With a view to liberalizing the ECB guidelines, RBI has decided that henceforth, 
Indian corporates can avail ECB of an additional amount of US$250 million with 
average maturity of more than 10 years, over and above the existing limit of USD 500 
million, during a financial year. 
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Table 1: Effect of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) on Net Domestic Assets (NDA) 
(Dependent variable: Change in NDA) 
Variables 1996Q2-2000Q3 2000Q4-2005Q1 2005Q2-2009Q3 
Change in NFA -0.768385*** 
(0.259622) 
-0.867774*** 
(0.260602) 
-0.443428*** 
(0.181335) 
Lagged change in 
NDA 
0.663150*** 
(0.199194) 
-0.214493 
(0.225896) 
0.047067 
(0.249181) 
Change in log of IP -14803.59*** 
(4816.056) 
-18653.10* 
(10987.70) 
-15150.19 
(38005.97) 
Constant 4865.866*** 
(1578.655) 
7989.290 
(5638.952) 
19861.67* 
(10865.56) 
Adj R squared 0.463650 0.444902 0.275034 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are 
denoted in parentheses.  
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      Table 2A: Trilemma Indices for India, 1996 – 2010 
  
1996-97:Q1 to 
2000-01:Q2 
2000-01:Q3 to 
2004-05:Q4 
2005-06:Q1 to 
2009-10:Q2 
 MI 0.5348 0.4197 0.4828 
Means ES 0.7601 0.8107 0.5901 
 KO 0.0385 0.0788 0.3140 
     
 MI 0.8107 -0.1793 0.4649 
Coefficients ES 1.7075*** 2.0412*** 2.1369*** 
 KO 5.3987 5.2079*** 1.4644* 
R-squared  0.9697 0.9950 0.9727 
 
 
       Table 2B: Trilemma Contributions 
  
1996-97:Q1 to 
2000-01:Q2 
2000-01:Q3 to 
2004-05:Q4 
2005-06:Q1 to 
2009-10:Q2 
 MI 0.4335 -0.0752 0.2245 
Contributions ES 1.2978 1.6548 1.2611 
 KO 0.2081 0.4105 0.4598 
Sum of 
contributions 
 
1.9395 1.9900 1.9454 
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Table 3: Inflation volatility, trilemma configuration and reserves 
 1996-97:Q1 to 2000-01:Q2 2000-01:Q3 to 2004-05:Q4 2005-06:Q1 to 2009-10:Q2 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0778 0.0329 0.0255 0.0438 0.0537 0.0838 
MI 0.0331 0.0265 -0.0103 0.0130 0.0440 0.0728 
ES -0.1184** 0.0487 -0.0201 0.0551 -0.1454 0.1339 
Res/GDP -1.0215** 0.4448 -0.0626 0.2428 -0.1404 0.3600 
MI*Res -0.5574 0.3750 0.0453 0.0895 -0.2354 0.3413 
ES*Res 1.7336** 0.6880 0.0573 0.3121 0.5809 0.5949 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0174 0.0463 -0.0075 0.0674 0.0731 0.0983 
KO 0.3067 0.4271 0.3507 0.2931 0.0259 0.1522 
ES -0.0320 0.0478 -0.0135 0.0697 -0.1639 0.1432 
Res/GDP -0.2164 0.6183 0.1923 0.3691 -0.2263 0.4163 
KO*Res -3.7099 4.8670 -2.2180 1.6243 -0.1776 0.6685 
ES*Res 0.4843 0.6597 -0.0383 0.3874 0.6636 0.6364 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept -0.0114 0.0190 -0.0079 0.0187 -0.0625 0.0519 
MI -0.0057 0.0258 -0.0054 0.0150 0.0343 0.0826 
KO 0.5534 0.3775 0.2395 0.2609 0.0882 0.1629 
Res/GDP 0.2053 0.2504 0.0792 0.1128 0.3359 0.2388 
MI*Res 0.0510 0.3436 0.0027 0.1075 -0.1825 0.3851 
KO*Res -6.4208 4.3087 -1.2308 1.4355 -0.4131 0.7148 
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Table 4: Inflation, trilemma configuration and reserves 
 1996-97:Q1 to 2000-01:Q2 2000-01:Q3 to 2004-05:Q4 2005-06:Q1 to 2009-10:Q2 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept -0.3360 0.1749 0.5480 0.1678 -0.3762 0.5114 
MI 0.0302 0.1406 -0.0872 0.0498 0.0022 0.4447 
ES 0.4792* 0.2586 -0.5847** 0.2110 0.6269 0.8175 
Res/GDP 5.3884** 2.3640 -2.4370** 0.9303 1.8456 2.1979 
MI*Res -0.5682 1.9927 0.3396 0.3429 -0.0242 2.0838 
ES*Res -6.6584* 3.6561 2.9826** 1.1959 -2.7331 3.6326 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept -0.2731 0.1910 0.8658 0.3516 -0.2068 0.5808 
KO -0.7058 1.7636 -1.4734 1.5296 -0.6762 0.8990 
ES 0.4882** 0.1972 -0.9030** 0.3637 0.7300 0.8461 
Res/GDP 4.4688 2.5533 -4.2087** 1.9261 1.0966 2.4591 
KO*Res 12.0971 20.0985 7.9661 8.4759 3.0958 3.9492 
ES*Res -6.9536** 2.7242 4.7011** 2.0216 -3.3030 3.7596 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0874 0.0809 0.0799 0.0762 0.1575 0.2948 
MI 0.1444 0.1099 -0.0603 0.0612 0.1098 0.4694 
KO -2.6536 1.6085 0.2136 1.0644 -0.7314 0.9250 
Res/GDP -0.3269 1.0668 -0.2947 0.4600 -0.4362 1.3564 
MI*Res -2.3020 1.4640 0.0329 0.4386 -0.5604 2.1875 
KO*Res 33.8496* 18.3572 1.5995 5.8562 3.1858 4.0600 
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Table 5: Inflation volatility, trilemma configuration and changes in reserves 
 1996-97:Q1 to 2000-01:Q2 2000-01:Q3 to 2004-05:Q4 2005-06:Q1 to 2009-10:Q2 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0036 0.0039 -0.0041 0.0238 0.0139 0.0097 
MI -0.0023 0.0062 -0.0038 0.0075 0.0137 0.0134 
ES 0.0033 0.0067 0.0134 0.0317 -0.0220 0.0121 
ΔRes/GDP 0.1032 0.1972 -0.4435 0.5005 0.2083 0.1787 
MI*ΔRes -0.0346 0.3736 0.0335 0.1711 0.1983 0.2132 
ES*ΔRes -0.1029 0.2840 0.5292 0.6666 -0.4727 0.3609 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0030 0.0027 0.0100 0.0336 0.0212 0.0126 
KO -0.0170 0.0265 -0.0221 0.0835 -0.0059 0.0241 
ES 0.0043 0.0041 -0.0036 0.0363 -0.0207 0.0141 
ΔRes/GDP 0.1497 0.1244 -0.1781 0.6539 0.2261 0.1783 
KO*ΔRes -5.9355*** 1.6765 -0.1921 1.5793 -0.3065 0.3245 
ES*ΔRes 0.1140 0.1771 0.2455 0.7166 -0.1645 0.2983 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0052 0.0022 0.0095 0.0064 0.0018 0.0071 
MI 0.0005 0.0037 0.0001 0.0063 0.0126 0.0121 
KO -0.0081 0.0261 -0.0466 0.0611 0.0072 0.0218 
ΔRes/GDP 0.1558 0.1281 0.0948 0.1370 0.1315 0.1153 
MI*ΔRes 0.0843 0.2238 0.2378 0.1646 0.1945 0.2125 
KO*ΔRes -5.6424*** 1.6411 -2.1651 1.3795 -0.3952 0.3671 
 
   25 
Table 6: Inflation, trilemma configuration and changes in reserves 
 
1996-97:Q1 to 2000-01:Q2 2000-01:Q3 to 2004-
05:Q4 
2005-06:Q1 to 2009-
10:Q2 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept 0.0638 0.0193 0.1641 0.1029 0.0025 0.0522 
MI -0.0628* 0.0310 -0.0910** 0.0326 0.0825 0.0718 
ES 0.0265 0.0334 -0.0864 0.1373 0.0173 0.0652 
ΔRes/GDP 0.6824 0.9859 1.1375 2.1689 1.7255* 0.9602 
MI*ΔRes -2.4189 1.8682 -1.4862* 0.7415 0.9982 1.1455 
ES*ΔRes 1.0092 1.4202 -0.4191 2.8888 -3.3214 1.9396 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept 0.0559 0.0203 0.2682 0.1724 -0.0566 0.0631 
KO 0.1970 0.2006 0.0847 0.4290 0.2314* 0.1202 
ES -0.0261 0.0311 -0.2671 0.1864 0.0789 0.0707 
ΔRes/GDP -0.0348 0.9417 4.0739 3.3607 1.0757 0.8907 
KO*ΔRes 15.9944 12.6942 -1.4020 8.1170 2.2183 1.6207 
ES*ΔRes -0.9507 1.3406 -4.6372 3.6829 -2.3226 1.4900 
  Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept 0.0680 0.0135 0.0905 0.0258 0.0159 0.0387 
MI -0.0547** 0.0230 -0.0807*** 0.0255 0.0023 0.0658 
KO 0.1899 0.1620 0.0569 0.2471 0.1473 0.1180 
ΔRes/GDP 0.4455 0.7963 1.0890* 0.5540 -0.0607 0.6247 
MI*ΔRes -2.0319 1.3910 -0.6641 0.6658 -0.2259 1.1517 
KO*ΔRes 16.2849 10.1976 -6.2057 5.5787 1.4725 1.9900 
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Figure 1: Financial Openness and Exchange Rate Volatility in India 
 
Source: Reproduced from IMF (2008) “India: Selected Issues” (February) IMF country 
Report No. 08/52. Underlying source for gross foreign assets and liabilities/gdp is Lane, 
P. and G. Milesi-Ferretti (2005).  
 
Figure 2: Foreign Exchange Market Intervention  
 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Monetary Base 
 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Figure 4: Monetary Independence Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 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Figure 5: Exchange Rate Stability Index 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6: Capital Account Openness Index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 7: The Trilemma and Reserve Accumulation 
Source: Authors’ calculations; See section 4 in text for further detail.  
 
Figure 8: Reserves-GDP Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
